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Abstract
We show that under a xed-price contract where an upstream rm rst sets the input
price and downstream rms subsequently invest in R&D, all rms can become worse
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 when considering two-way trade with rm-specic carriers.
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1 Introduction
In a vertical production structure, the downstream rms' innovation can enable an
upstream rm's opportunistic behavior. For example, a downstream rms' R&D eorts
to improve eciency enhance input-demand for their trading upstream rms, allowing
them to raise their input prices.
To overcome this opportunistic behavior, researchers often emphasize that a xed-
price contract in which the upstream rm rst sets the input price and commits not
to change the price after the downstream R&D is required. This long-term input-price
contract can lead to lower input price and larger investments, and thus, brings higher
prot for all rms (Banerjee and Lin, 2003; Zikos and Kesavayuth, 2010).
However, this proposition may not hold when a lower input price does not bring a
substantial eciency improvement. For example, if a lower input price yields excessive
investments by downstream rms, causing a loss in their prots while not suciently
enhancing their input-demand, there is a possibility that the long-term input-price
contract works negatively for both upstream and downstream rms.
Our objective is to examine the argument of input-price contract with downstream
R&D in the context of international trade with transportation. Considering a long-
distance trade, transportation is an essential input for exporting rms to convey their
products, and the transport-price is an important factor which aects innovation through
market access and competition.1 To conclude, in a two-country trade model with rm-
specic carriers, the xed-price contract of transport price can make all rms worse
1It is well-known that trade and transport costs aect innovative activity of producers through
market access and competition. See, for example, Aghion et al. (2004).
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o. In our setting, each country's downstream rm freely supplies to the domestic
market, while it pays the transport price for a rm-specic carrier to export. The
export is less ecient compared with domestic supply. Since a lower transport price
promotes inecient exports, the xed-price contract reduces the downstream rms'
prot. Further, lower transport price does not suciently enhance transport-demand
and the xed-price contract can reduce the carrier's prot.
This paper is related to works on input-price contract with downstream R&D
(Banerjee and Lin, 2003; Kesavayuth and Zikos, 2009; Zikos and Kesavayuth, 2010).
Banerjee and Lin (2003) show that xed-price contract makes all rms better o.
Zikos and Kesavayuth (2010) conrm that the Banerjee{Lin's result holds even if R&D
spillovers exist. Kesavayuth and Zikos (2009) examine the role of R&D spillovers and
the importance of wage (input price) for labor unions on an endogenous choice of con-
tract forms of wage by union{rm pair. However, these analyses are limited to the
domestic market and do not consider international trade and transportation.
Works studying international transportation2 with downstream R&D3 (Takauchi,
2015a, b) are also closely related. In a duopoly trade model with a monopoly car-
rier, Takauchi (2015a) examines the eects of ecient R&D technology on rms' prof-
its. Takauchi (2015b) investigates the eects of R&D spillovers, carriers' transport
2There are other studies that consider transportation in international oligopoly (Abe et al., 2014;
Ishikawa and Tarui, 2015; Matsushima and Takauchi, 2014). While Abe et al. (2014) examine the
eects of upstream emission tax and downstream tari, Ishikawa and Tarui (2015) focus on the logistics
problem of the carrier's roundtrips and examine the eects of several trade policies. Matsushima and
Takauchi (2014) consider the eect of privatization of a sea-port on its usage fee (trade barrier) and
welfares.
3Ghosh and Lim (2013), Haaland and Kind (2008), and Long et al. (2011) consider the relationship
between trade costs and innovation without upstream agents. They examine the eects of an exogenous
trade cost reduction on rms and industrial investments.
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eciency, and competition in the upstream transport market on innovation and wel-
fares under a similar two-country trade model. Although these studies focus on the
transportation with downstream R&D, they do not consider input-price contracts by
upstream agents.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 oers the model. Section 3
derives the outcomes and compares those between two input-price schemes. All proofs
are depicted in the appendix.
2 Model
We consider a duopolistic two-way trade model with rm-specic carriers, as in Takauchi
(2015a, b). There are two symmetric countries, H and F , which have a homogeneous
product market. Each country has a single producing rm (called rm i, i = H;F ) and
a rm-specic carrier (called carrier i). While rm i freely supplies to the domestic
market, it must use carrier i and pay a per-unit transport price, ti, to export. Before
production, rms engage in cost-reducing R&D competition without spillovers. The
prot of rm i is given by
i  (a  qii   qji   (c  xi))qii + (a  qjj   qij   (c  xi)  ti)qij   x2i ; (1)
where qii is rm i's domestic supply, qij is i's export, qji is rm j's export, xi is rm i's
investment level, x2i is the R&D cost, and i 6= j; i; j = H;F ; a; c;  > 0 and a  c > 0.
The carrier i makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to rm i and decides its price. Each
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carrier's prot is i  tiqij .4
We compare outcomes between two input-price schemes.5 The rst is a xed-price
contract where each carrier rst sets its transport price and the rms subsequently
invest; the second is a oating price contract where rms rst invest and each carrier
subsequently sets its price. In all these, each rm decides its outputs in the nal stage
of the game and competes a la Cournot at both markets in H and F . The game is
solved by backward induction.
3 Results
In the nal-stage, each rm decides outputs to maximize its prot. The rst-order
conditions for prot maximization are @i=@qii =  2qii qji+xi = 0 and @i=@qij =
 2qij qjj+xi  ti = 0, where   a c. These yield qii(tj ;x) = (+ tj+2xi xj)=3
and qij(ti;x) = (  2ti + 2xi   xj)=3. Let x = (xi; xj).
In the xed-price contract, each rm chooses an investment level at the second stage.
The second-stage investment level is xi(t) =
4(3 4) 4(3 2)ti+6tj
(3 4)(9 4) , where t = (ti; tj).
This yields the equilibrium transport price:
tfxi =
9(3   4)
4(3   1)(9   10) : (2)
The outcome in the xed-price contract is labeled \fx." From (2), we have the outcomes
4Our main result does not alter even though the other trade cost  exists (i.e., i  (ti   )qij).
5Even if we consider a simultaneous move where rm's investment and carrier's transport price are
simultaneously decided, our main result does not change. Therefore, for simplicity, we omit the case of
simultaneous move.
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in the xed-price contract:
qfxii =
3(1352   210 + 64)
4(3   1)(9   10)(9   4) ; q
fx
ij =
3(9   8)
2(9   10)(9   4) ;
xfxi =
(1892   276 + 80)
2(3   1)(9   10)(9   4) ; 
fx
i =
272(3   4)(9   8)2
8(3   1)(9   10)2(9   4) ;
fxi =
(1902695 7173364+10244883 6865922+215808 25600)2
16(3   1)2(9   10)2(9   4)2 : (3)
To ensure a positive quantity, we assume that  > 4=3.6
In a similar manner as in the above, we obtain the outcome in the oating price
contract.
qlii =
60
144   43; q
l
ij =
24
144   43; x
l
i =
43
144   43 ;
tli =
36
144   43; 
l
i =
86422
(144   43)2 ; 
l
i =
(4176   1849)2
(144   43)2 : (4)
The outcome in the oating price contract is labeled \l."
From (2)-(4), we obtain Lemmas 1{3.
Lemma 1. (i) tli > t
fx
i . (ii) @t
fx
i =@  (>) 0 if   (<) 2
 p
15 + 5

=3 ' 5:91532;
@tli=@ < 0.
Lemma 2. xfxi > x
l
i.
Lemma 3. (I) For the export, qfxij > q
l
ij. (II) For the domestic supply, (i) q
l
ii > q
fx
ii
if  <
 p
23521 + 239

=225 ' 1:74385 and qfxii  qlii if  
 p
23521 + 239

=225; (ii)
@qfxii =@  (>) 0 if   (<) dq ' 1:48449, and @qlii=@ < 0.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 is intuitive. In the xed-price contract, each carrier sets its price
6As long as this assumption holds, the second-order conditions for the prot maximization of carriers
and rms are satised.
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in the rst stage of the game and oers lower price to raise transport-demand. In the
oating price contract, the transport-price setting does not directly aect investments,
and thus, the transport price becomes higher (Panel (a) of Fig. 1).
Lemma 2 is intuitively explained as follows. A lower transport price encourages
investment thorough a reduction in export costs. In the xed-price (oating price)
contract, the investment is larger (smaller) because the export cost is lower (higher)
(Panel (b) of Fig. 1).
The rationale behind Part (I) of Lemma 3 is as follows. A lower transport price
raises exports, and hence, the export in the xed-price contract is larger than that in
the oating price contract (Panel (d) of Fig. 1). On the one hand, the domestic supply
has a dierent feature from that of exports (Part (II) of Lemma 3). In the xed-price
contract, the rival's export is the most aggressive; it crowds out the domestic supply.
The domestic supply decreases as  goes below a certain level, because a smaller 
sharply raises exports.7 Therefore, the domestic supply in the xed-price contract can
become smaller than that in the oating price contract (Panel (c) of Fig. 1). However,
the transport price does not directly aect investments in the oating price contract:
the usual result holds (@qlii=@ < 0).
Finally, we consider Part (ii) of Lemma 1. A smaller  corresponds to lower R&D-
cost and higher R&D incentives. Thus, carriers reduce the transport price to cause
further investments and exports as  decreases. In the oating price contract, the
transport price rises as  decreases because the transport-price setting does not directly
7In fact, @qkij=@ < 0 holds for k = fx; l.
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aect investments.
(3) and (4) yield Proposition.
Proposition. (i) li > 
fx
i if  < 
 ' 1:74661; fxi > li if  > . (ii) li > fxi .
Part (i) is explained as follows. In the xed-price contract, the transport price
sharply drops as  goes below a certain level, and thus, the prot can decrease as 
decreases. For this reason, the prot in the xed-price contract can be smaller than
that in the oating price contract (Panel (a) in Fig. 2).
Part (ii) is explained by exports and investments. The export is less ecient because
it requires rms to pay transport prices. While the export is the most active and the
ineciency is large in the xed-price contract, its investment is larger than that in the
oating price contract. This increases the loss, and hence, the prot in the xed-price
contract is smaller (Panel (b) in Fig. 2).
A liner quadratic production cost. When we relax the assumption of a constant
marginal production cost, do the results change? To consider this, let us introduce a
liner quadratic production cost: (c   xi)(qii + qij) + (qii + qij)2. Although this yields
an increasing marginal cost, the same result holds if  is small enough.8
Acknowledgments
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) tli   tfxi = 27(27 4)4(3 1)(9 10)(144 43) > 0. (ii) Dierentiating tki
w.r.t. , we have @tli=@ =   1548(43 144)2 < 0 and @tfxi =@ =  [9(92 60+40)]=[4(9 
10)2(3   1)2]. Thus, @tfxi =@  (>) 0 if   (<) 2(
p
15 + 5)=3 ' 5:91532. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. xfxi   xli = 9(702
2 933+248)
2(3 1)(9 10)(9 4)(144 43) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. (I) For the export, qfxij   qlij = 3(477 296)2(9 10)(9 4)(144 43) > 0.
(II) For the domestic supply, (i) qlii qfxii =  3(675
2 1434+448)
4(3 1)(9 10)(9 4)(144 43) . Thus, q
l
ii qfxii 
(<) 0 if   (>) (p23521 + 239)=225 ' 1:74385. (ii) Dierentiating qkii w.r.t. , we
have @qlii=@ =   2580(43 144)2 < 0 and @qfxii =@ = [ 3(109354   353163 + 384842  
16800 + 2560)]=[4(3   1)2(9   10)2(9   4)2]. Thus, @qfxii =@  (>) if   (<)
dq ' 1:48449. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition. (i) For the carrier's prot,
fxi   li =
272(1010883   2853092 + 214692   43232)2
8(3   1)(9   10)2(9   4)(144   43)2 :
Thus, fxi   li  (>) 0 if   (>)  ' 1:74661. (ii) For the rm's prot, li  
fxi =

92(643502885   2016158854 + 2325808083   1243443602 + 31260864  
2993408)2

16(3   1)2(9   10)2(9   4)2(144   43)2 > 0. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Lemmas 1{3.
Note: Blue curve is k = fx; red curve is k = l.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition.
Note: Blue curve is k = fx; red curve is k = l.
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Supplemental Materials
Outcome in the case of linear quadratic production cost
When rms have a liner quadratic cost, that is, (c xi)(qii+qij) + (qii+qij)2, the rm
i's prot is rewritten as
i  (a qii qji)qii + (a qjj qij ti)qij  

(c xi)(qii+qij) + (qii+qij)2
  x2i :
FOCs for the prot maximization at the third stage of the game are @i=@qii =   
4qii   qji   2qij + xi = 0 and @i=@qij =    4qij   qjj   2qii   ti + xi = 0. These
yield the third-stage outputs: qii(t;x) = (15 + 26ti + 19tj + 18xi   3xj)=105 and
qij(t;x) = (15   44ti   16tj + 18xi   3xj)=105. Using these third-stage outputs and
the carrier's prot, we obtain the following outcome in the xed-price contract:
q^fxii =
7(1825252   62370 + 5184)
4z1
; q^fxij =
7(385   72)
2(91   18)(245   36) ;
x^fxi =
9(472852   15876 + 1296)
2z1
; t^fxi =
21(175   36)
4(70   9)(91   18) ;
^fxi =
1472(673752   26460 + 2592)2
8(91   18)z1 ; ^
fx
i =
3z2
2
8z12
;
where z1  (70   9)(91   18)(245   36) > 0
and z2  7522918243755   6281865954004 + 2082852613803   342715847042 +
2798240256   90699264 > 0. Throughout this supplemental material, the variables of
equilibrium outcome in all schemes are denoted by \^."
By a similar procedure as in the above, we obtain the following equilibrium outcomes
for the oating price contract:
q^lii =
62580
305760 39551; q^
l
ij =
18480
305760 39551; x^
l
i =
39551
305760 39551; t^
l
i =
44100
305760 39551 ;
^li =
81496800022
(305760 39551)2 ; ^
l
i =
(10828490400   1564281601)2
(305760 39551)2 :
To ensure positive quantity, we need  > 36=175 ' 0:205714.
i
Let us compare the prots of rms and carriers between two input-price schemes.
For the rm's prot,
^li   ^fxi =
 
72z3
2

8(70   9)2(91   18)2(245   36)2(305760   39551)2 > 0;
where
z3  799374723559430200005   625815943465821858754 + 194179454154370188003
  29859628688487851402 + 227661814729998432   6888591842745600 > 0:
For the carrier's prot,
^fxi   ^li =
1472z4
2
8(70   9)(91   18)2(245   36)(305760   39551)2 ;
where z4  1239682975440003 642887325022252+10893161153700 601277642208.
From this, ^fxi   ^li  (>) 0 if   (>) ^ ' 0:212379.
Summarizing these, we obtain the following.
Result.9 Suppose that rm i has a linear quadratic production cost and the R&D eort
reduces its linear coecient, that is, (c xi)(qii+ qij)+ (qii+ qij)2. Then, a xed-price
contract by the rm-specic carrier makes carriers and rms worse o if and only if
 < ^ ' 0:212379.
9Also, this result does not change even if we consider the simultaneous move of carriers and rms.
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